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 Research on judgment and decision making presents a confusing picture of 
human  abilities.  For  example,  much  research  has  emphasized  the  dysfunctional 
aspects of judgmental heuristics, and yet, other findings suggest that these can be 
highly effective.  A further line of research has modeled judgment as resulting from 
“as if” linear models. This paper illuminates the distinctions in these approaches by 
providing a common analytical framework based on the central theoretical premise 
that understanding human performance requires specifying how characteristics of the 
decision rules people use interact with the demands of the tasks they face.  Our work 
synthesizes  the analytical  tools  of  “lens  model”  research  with  novel methodology 
developed  to  specify  the  effectiveness  of  heuristics  in  different  environments and 
allows direct comparisons between the different approaches. We illustrate with both 
theoretical  analyses  and  simulations.  We  further  link  our  results  to  the  empirical 
literature  by  a  meta-analysis  of  lens  model  studies  and  estimate  both  human  and 
heuristic performance in the same tasks.  Our results highlight the trade-off between 
linear models and heuristics. Whereas the former are cognitively demanding, the latter 
are simple to use. However, they require knowledge – and thus “maps” – of when and 
which heuristic to employ.   
 
Keywords:  Decision  making;  heuristics;  linear  models;  lens  model;  judgmental 
biases. 
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Two classes of models have dominated research on judgment and decision 
making over the last decades.  In one, explicit recognition is given to the costs and 
limits of information processing and people are assumed to use simplifying heuristics 
– typically making use of only part of the information available (Kahneman, Slovic, 
& Tversky, 1982; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research Group, 1999).  In the other, 
it is assumed that people can integrate all the information at hand and that this is 
combined  and  weighted  “as  if”  using  an  algebraic  –  typically  linear  –  model 
(Anderson, 1981; Brehmer, 1994; Hammond, 1996).       
Research on these models has been conducted within different traditions with 
few attempts to unify the two approaches (however, see Hammond, 1990). Whereas 
such unification is not our goal, we recognize the validity of both approaches and seek 
to  illuminate  their  complementarities.  For  example,  recent  research  suggests  that 
people can process  information in distinctive  ways  (cf., Chaiken  & Trope,  1999),   
variously described as “experiential” vs. “rational” (Epstein, 1994),  “System 1” vs. 
“System 2” (Stanovich & West, 1998), or “tacit” vs. “deliberate” (Hogarth, 2001). 
The former denote processes that are intuitive or heuristic whereas the latter are the 
outcomes  of  more  deliberative  processes.  We  do  not  propose  a  one-to-one 
correspondence between the dual process approach, on the one hand, and heuristic 
and  algebraic  models,  on  the  other  hand.  However,  the  analogy  emphasizes  the 
advantages of seeking complementarities.        
The topic of heuristics has been central to research on judgment and decision 
making and has generated many interesting findings as well as controversy (see, e.g., 
Gigerenzer,  1996;  Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1996.)  However,  whereas  few  scholars 
doubt that people make extensive use of heuristics (as variously defined) in everyday 
life,  many  questions are  still  unresolved.    One important  set  of issues centers  on   4 
understanding  the  relative  efficacy  of  different  heuristics  and,  in  particular, 
explicating the environmental conditions when these are effective.   
At one level, this failure is surprising in that Herbert Simon – whose work is 
held in high esteem by researchers with differing views about heuristics – specifically 
emphasized the importance of environmental factors.   In particular, some 50 years 
ago, Simon stated 
...if an organism is confronted with the problem of behaving approximately 
rationally,  or  adaptively,  in  a  particular  environment,  the  kinds  of 
simplifications that are suitable may depend not only on the characteristics – 
sensory, neural, and other – of the organism, but equally on the nature of the 
environment (Simon, 1956, p. 130).  
 
Interest, however, of most research on heuristics has centered on specific rules 
such  as  representativeness  (Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1972),  availability  (Tversky  & 
Kahneman, 1973),  recognition (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), and affect (Slovic, 
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002) that limit information processing costs and 
there have been few attempts to understand possible environmental effects.
1  
At the same time that Simon was publishing his seminal work on heuristics, 
the  use  of  algebraic,  and  particularly  linear  models,  to  represent  psychological 
processes  received  considerable  impetus  from  Hammond’s  (1955)  formulation  of 
clinical judgment, and was subsequently bolstered by Hoffman’s (1960) argument for 
“paramorphic” representation (see also Einhorn, Kleinmuntz, & Kleinmuntz, 1979).
2  
Contrary to work on heuristics, this research has shown concern for environmental 
factors.  Specifically,  by  depicting  Brunswik’s  (1952)  lens  model  within  a  linear 
framework,  Hammond  and  his  colleagues  were  able  to  describe  psychological 
                                                
1  As  stated  ironically  by  one  of  our  colleagues,  it  is  as  though  researchers  on  heuristics  suffer 
collectively from the “fundamental attribution error” (Ross, 1977) whereby explanations of behavior 
fail to take environmental factors into consideration.  
 
2 The earliest representation of judgment as a linear model that we know of goes back to Wallace 
(1923).   5 
achievement in the form of an equation – the lens model equation – that captures 
effects of both individuals and the environment (Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, 1964; 
Hursch, Hammond, & Hursch, 1964; Tucker, 1964). Moreover, this framework has 
been  profitably  used  by  many  researchers  (see,  e.g.,  Brehmer  &  Joyce,  1988; 
Cooksey, 1996; Hastie & Kameda, 2005). Other techniques such as conjoint analysis 
(cf., Louvière, 1988) also assume that people process information as though using 
linear models and, in so doing, seek to quantify the relative weights given to different 
variables affecting judgments and decisions (see also, Anderson, 1981). 
In many ways the linear model has been the “work-horse” of judgment and 
decision making research from both descriptive and prescriptive viewpoints. As to the 
latter,  consider  the  influence  of  linear  models  in  multi-attribute  theory  (see,  e.g., 
Keeney & Raiffa, 1976) as well as the literatures on bootstrapping (Goldberg, 1970; 
Camerer, 1981; Russo & Schoemaker, 2002), equal-weighting (Dawes & Corrigan, 
1974; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1975; Wainer, 1976; Dawes, 1979), and the statistical-
clinical debate (Meehl, 1954; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Kleinmuntz, 1990).   
However,  despite  the  ubiquity  of  the  linear  model  in  representing  human 
information integration, its psychological validity has been questioned.  First, when 
the amount of  information  exceeds a threshold (e.g., three cues in a  multiple-cue 
prediction  task),  people  have  difficulty  in  executing  linear  rules  and  resort  to 
simplifying heuristics. Second, the linear model implies trade-offs between cues or 
attributes and, because people find these difficult to execute – both cognitively and 
emotionally (Hogarth, 1987; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999) – they often resort to 
trade-off avoiding heuristics (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).  
This  discussion  of  heuristics  and  linear  models  raises  many  important 
psychological issues. Under what conditions do people use heuristics – and which   6 
heuristics – and how effective are these relative to the more cognitively demanding 
linear model?  Moreover, if heuristics neglect information and/or avoid trade-offs, 
how do these features contribute to their success or failure, and when?   
  Our purpose is to illuminate these and related issues within the context of 
predicting  (choosing)  the  better  of  two  alternatives  on  the  basis  of  several  cues 
(attributes).  Moreover, we assume that the criterion is probabilistically related to the 
cues and that the optimal equation for predicting the criterion is a linear function of 
the cues. Thus, if the decision maker weights the cues appropriately (using a linear 
model)  she  will  achieve  the  maximum  predictive  performance.    However  (as  we 
explain  below),  this  is  an  exacting  standard  to  achieve.  Thus,  what  are  the 
consequences of abandoning the linear rule and using simpler heuristics? Moreover, 
when will different heuristics perform relatively well or badly?  
  Specifically,  we  consider  five  models  and,  to  simplify  the  analysis,  only 
consider three cues. (We return to this issue in the Discussion.)  Two of these models 
are linear and three are heuristics.  Whereas we could have chosen many variations of 
these models, we believe they are sufficient to illustrate our approach.   
    First, we consider what happens when the decision maker can be modeled as if 
she were using a linear combination of the cues (LC) with respect to the weights 
applied to the variables and is also inconsistent (cf., Hoffman, 1960).  Note carefully 
that we are not saying that the decision maker actually uses a linear formula but can 
be modeled “as if.”  We justify this approach on the grounds that linear models can 
often  provide  higher-level  representations  of  underlying  processes  such  that  their 
outcomes are consistent with a variety of different models (for further elaboration, see 
Einhorn et al., 1979).  Moreover, when the amount of information to be integrated is   7 
limited,  the  linear  model  can  also  provide  a  good  process  description  (Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1993).    
Second, the decision maker is unable to differentiate the weights that should 
be given to the variables and simplifies by giving equal weight to each (EW).
3  EW, 
of  course,  is  a  special  case  of  LC  and  has  been  demonstrated  to  have  desirable 
properties (Dawes & Corrigan, 1974).   
Third, the decision maker uses the “take-the-best” (TTB) heuristic proposed 
by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996). This works as follows.  It is first assumed that 
the decision maker can order attributes or cues by their ability to predict the criterion.  
Choice is then made by the most predictive cue that can discriminate between options. 
If no cues discriminate, choice is made at random.  This model is “fast and frugal” in 
that it typically decides on the basis of one or two cues (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC 
Research Group, 1999).
4   
There is experimental evidence that people use TTB-like strategies, although 
not exclusively (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; 2002; Bröder, 2000; 2003; Bröder & 
Schiffer,  2003;  Newell  &  Shanks,  2003;  Newell,  Weston,  &  Shanks,  2003). 
Descriptively, the two most important criticisms are, first, that the stopping rule is 
often violated in that people seek more information than the model specifies, and 
second, people may not be able to rank order the cues by predictive ability (Juslin & 
Persson, 2002). 
The fourth model, CONF (Karelaia, 2006) was developed to overcome the 
descriptive shortcomings of TTB. Its spirit is to consult the cues in the order of their 
                                                
3 In all of the models investigated, we assume that if the decision maker uses a variable, she knows its 
zero-order correlation with the criterion. 
4 In Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996) formulation, TTB operates on cues that can only take binary 
values (i.e., 0/1).  We analyze a version of this model based on continuous cues where discrimination is 
determined by a threshold, i.e., a cue only discriminates between two alternatives if the difference 
between the values of the cues exceeds a specified value t (>0).   8 
validity (like TTB) but not to stop the process once a discriminating cue has been 
identified. Instead, the process only stops once the discrimination has been confirmed 
by another cue. With three cues, then, CONF only requires that two cues favor the 
chosen alternative. Moreover, CONF has the advantage that choice is insensitive to 
the order in which cues are consulted.  Thus, the decision maker does not need to 
know the relative validities of the cues.
5 
Finally, our fifth model is based solely on the single variable (SV) that the 
decision  maker  believes  to  be  most  predictive.    This  therefore  also  models  any 
heuristic that is based on a single variable such as in judgments by representativeness 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972), availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), recognition 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2002), or affect (Slovic et al., 2002).  In these latter cases, 
however, the variable would not necessarily be observable by a third party but would 
represent an intuitive feeling or judgment experienced by the decision maker in the 
situation (e.g., an assessment of similarity, knowledge of recognition, or a feeling of 
liking). 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
It  is  important  to  note  that  all  these  rules  represent  feasible  psychological 
processes.  Figure 1 specifies and compares what needs to be known for each of the 
models to achieve its maximum performance. As can be seen, this can be decomposed 
between knowledge about the specific cue values taken by the three variables under 
consideration (on the left) and what is needed to weight the variables (on the right).  
Two models require knowing all cue values (LC and EW) and one only needs to 
know one (SV).  The number of cue values required by TTB and CONF depends on 
                                                
5 In our subsequent modeling of CONF, we assume that any difference between cue values is sufficient 
to indicate discrimination or confirmation. In principle, one could also assume a threshold in the same 
way that we model TTB.   9 
the characteristics of each choice faced.  As to weights, maximum performance by LC 
requires precise, absolute knowledge; TTB requires the ability to rank-order cues by 
validity; and for SV one needs to identify the cue with the greatest validity (if there is 
more than one). Neither EW nor CONF requires knowledge about weights. 
Whereas  it  is difficult  to tell whether obtaining  values  of  cue  variables or 
knowing something about how cues vary in importance is more taxing cognitively, we 
have attempted an ordering of the models in Figure  1 from most to  least taxing.  
Clearly, LC is the most taxing and, as noted above, the important issue to understand 
is  how  sensitive  it  is  to  deviations  from  optimal  specification  of  its  parameters. 
CONF, at the other extreme, is not demanding and the only uncertainty centers on 
how many variables need to be consulted for each decision. 
In our analysis, we adopt a Brunswikian perspective by exploiting properties 
of the well known lens model equation (Hammond, Hursch, & Todd, 1964; Hursch, 
Hammond, & Hursch, 1964; Tucker, 1964; Hammond & Stewart, 2001) combined 
with more recent analytic methods that were developed to determine the performance 
of heuristic decision rules (Hogarth  &  Karelaia,  2005a; in press; Karelaia,  2006). 
Using these tools, we are able to describe how environmental characteristics interact 
with those of the different heuristics in determining the performance of the latter.    
The  novelty  of  our  approach  is  that  we  are  able  to  compare  and  contrast 
heuristic  and  linear  model  performance  within  the  same  analytical  framework.  
Moreover,  noting  that  different  models  require  different  levels  of  knowledge  (cf. 
Figure 1), we see our work as mapping the demand for knowledge in different regions 
of the environment. In other words, to make effective decisions, how much and what 
knowledge is needed in different types of situations?     10 
In brief, our analytical results show that the performance of heuristic rules is 
affected by the type of weighting function (i.e., how the environment weights cues); 
cue  inter-correlation;  the  predictability  of  the  environment;  and  loss  functions.  
Whereas the weighting function determines which heuristic is best suited to specific 
tasks, the other factors moderate the advantages of selecting the correct rule.  Both 
cue redundancy (i.e., inter-correlation) and noise (i.e., lack of predictability) reduce 
differences between model performance but these can be augmented or diminished 
according  to  the  loss function  used.   We  also show  that  “sensible”  models make 
identical predictions in more cases than might have been imagined a priori. However, 
since they disagree across 8-30% of the cases we examined, it pays to understand the 
differences. 
We  exploit  the  mathematics  of  the lens  model  (Tucker,  1964) to ask  how 
“well” decision makers need to execute LC rule strategies to perform as well or better 
than heuristics in binary choice.  We find that performance using LC rules generally 
falls short of that of appropriate heuristics unless decision makers have high “linear 
cognitive ability” (which we quantify).  This analysis is supported by a meta-analysis 
of lens model studies in which we estimate linear cognitive ability across some 250 
tasks and also demonstrate that, within the same tasks, individuals vary in their ability 
to outperform heuristics using LC models.             
This paper is organized as follows.  We first briefly review literature that has 
considered the effectiveness of heuristic decision models. For the most part, this has 
been  dependent  on  empirical  demonstrations  and  simulations  and,  as  such, 
conclusions cannot be easily generalized. In contrast, our approach, developed in the 
subsequent section, is based on statistical theory.  This allows us to make theoretical 
predictions of model accuracy in terms of both percentage correct predictions and   11 
expected losses. To facilitate the exposition, we present the underlying rationale with 
respect to the SV, LC, and EW models in the main text and the equations for the other 
models in Appendices A and B. We demonstrate the power of our equations with 
theoretical  predictions  of  differential  model  performance  over  a  wide  range  of 
environments as well as using simulation.  This is followed by our examination of 
empirical  data  using  meta-analysis  of  the  lens  model  literature  and  leads  to  the 
conclusions summarized above. Finally, we consider psychological, normative, and 
methodological implications of our work as well as suggestions for future research. 
    
Evidence on the effectiveness of simple, heuristic models    
  Interest in the use of heuristic decision models has fueled much research (and 
controversy) in judgment and decision making.  The initial impetus from Simon’s 
work on bounded rationality  (Simon,  1955; 1956)  was  to emphasize the need for 
humans  to  use  heuristic  methods  (or  to  “satisfice”)  because  of  inherent  cognitive 
limitations.  Moreover,  Simon  stressed  the  importance  of  understanding  how  the 
structure of the environment affects the relative effectiveness heuristics.   
  This environmental concern, however, was largely lacking from the influential 
research on “heuristics and biases” spearheaded by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
(see  also  Kahneman,  Slovic,  &  Tversky,  1982).    As  stated  by  these  researchers, 
“These  heuristics  are  highly  economical  and  usually  effective,  but  they  lead  to 
systematic  and  predictable  errors”  (Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1974,  p.  1131).  
Unfortunately, no environmental theory was offered specifying the conditions under 
which heuristics were or were not effective (cf., Hogarth, 1981). 
  Nonetheless,  the  positive  side  of  heuristic  use  has  also  been  emphasized.  
(Although, here too a concern for explicating environmental limitations has not been   12 
paramount.)  One  line  of  research  has  emphasized  equal-weighting  models,  the 
effectiveness of which was demonstrated through simulations and empirical examples 
(Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Dawes, 1979).  In further simulations, Payne, Bettman and 
Johnson (1993) explored trade-offs between effort and accuracy. Using continuous 
variables  and  a  weighted  additive  model  as  the  criterion,  they  investigated  the 
performance  of  several  models  and  specifically  demonstrated  the  effects  of  two 
important environmental variables, dispersion in the weighting of variables and the 
extent to which choices involved dominance. (See also Thorngate, 1980.)    
  The predictive effectiveness of TTB was first demonstrated by Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein (1996) in an empirical illustration and then subsequently replicated over 18 
further datasets (Gigerenzer, Todd, et al., 1999). Specifically, these studies showed 
that  TTB  predicted  more  accurately  (on  cross-validation)  than  EW  and  multiple 
regression  when the criterion was the percentage of correct predictions (in  binary 
choice). However, there was little concern as to whether these outcomes were the 
result of favorable environmental conditions. Voicing these concerns, Shanteau and 
Thomas (2000) constructed environments that they reasoned would be  “friendly” or 
“unfriendly” to different models and demonstrated these effects through simulations. 
However, they did not address the issue of the relative frequencies of friendly and 
unfriendly environments in natural decision making contexts. 
  Environmental  effects  were  also  demonstrated  by  Fasolo,  McClelland,  and 
Todd (in press) in a simulation of multi-attribute choice using continuous variables 
(involving 21 options characterized by six attributes).  Their goal was to assess how 
well choices by models with differing numbers of attributes could match total utility 
and, in doing so, they varied levels of average inter-correlations among the attributes 
and types of weighting functions.  Results showed important effects for both. With   13 
differential weighting, one attribute was sufficient to capture at least 90% of total 
utility.  With  positive  inter-correlation  among  attributes,  there  was  little  difference 
between equal and differential weighting.  With negative inter-correlation, however, 
equal weighting was sensitive to the number of attributes used (the more, the better).  
   Despite  these  empirical  demonstrations  involving  simulated  and  real  data, 
there has been relatively little theoretical work aimed at elucidating the environmental 
conditions under which heuristic models are and are not effective. Some work has, 
however,  considered  specific  cases.  Einhorn  and  Hogarth  (1975),  for  example, 
provided a theoretical rationale for the effectiveness of equal weighting relative to 
multiple regression. Martignon  and Hoffrage  (1999; 2002)  and Katsikopoulos and 
Martignon (in press) explored the conditions under which TTB or equal weighting 
should be preferred in binary choice. Hogarth and Karelaia (2005a; in press, a) and 
Baucells, Carrasco, and Hogarth (2006) have examined why TTB and other simple 
models perform well with binary attributes in error-free environments.   
  Finally, in related work (Hogarth & Karelaia, 2005b; in press, b), we have 
provided  an  analytical  framework  for  determining  what  we  named  “regions  of 
rationality,” i.e., the specification of when heuristic models are and are not effective. 
The current paper builds on these foundations. 
  To facilitate presentation of our analytical results, we first briefly explain the 
logic of the lens model and the so-called “lens model equation” (Tucker, 1964).   We 
then derive equations for the predictive ability of the heuristics we examine in terms 
of expected predicted correct in binary choice as well as squared-error loss functions. 
Our strategy involves presenting the key ideas in the main text with details provided 
in appendices.  An important difference between studies of heuristic judgment and 
those using the LC framework (or lens model) is that the empirical criterion for the   14 
latter – known as “achievement” – is framed within the context of the correlation 
between judgments  and  outcomes as  opposed  to  percentage  correct  predictions in 
binary  choice.    In  comparing  paradigms,  therefore,  we  transform  correlational 
achievement into equivalent percentage correct in binary choice.    
 
Theoretical development 
To motivate the theoretical development, imagine a binary choice situation 
that involves selecting one of two job candidates, A and B, on the basis of several   
characteristics such as level of professional qualifications, years of experience, and so 
on.    Further,  imagine  that  a  criterion  variable,  i.e.,  a  measure  of  subsequent  job 
performance, can be observed at a later date and that a correct decision was taken if 
the criterion is greater for the chosen candidate.
6  Denote the criterion by the random 
variable Ye such that if A happened to be the correct choice, one would observe yea > 
yeb.
7  
Within the lens model framework – see Figure 2 – we can model assessments 
of candidates by two equations: one, the model of the environment; the other, the 
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6  In  practice  one  would  typically  only  be  able  to  observe  the  criterion  on  the  chosen  candidate. 
However, there are many other practical cases where this is not a problem, e.g., choosing consumer 
products.   
7 We use upper case letters to denote random variables, e.g., e Y , and lower case letters to designate 
specific values, e.g.,  e y .  As exceptions to this practice, we use lower case Greek letters to denote 
random error variables, e.g.,  e e  as well as parameters, e.g., j e, b .   15 
where Ye represents the criterion (subsequent job performance of candidates) and Ys is 
the judgment of the criterion made by the decision maker; the Xj’s are cues (here 
characteristics of the candidates); and ee and es are normally distributed error terms 
with means of zero and constant variances, independent of each other and of the X’s.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
  Assuming linearity, the logic of the lens model is that the judge’s decisions 
will match the environmental criterion to the extent that the weights the judge gives to 
the cues match those used by the model of the environment, i.e., the matches between 
bs,j  and  be,j  for  all  j  =  1,…k.  Moreover,  the  correlation  between  criterion  and 
judgment,  
s eY Y r – the “achievement” index – can be expressed (Tucker, 1964) by      
    
( )( )
2 2
ˆ ˆ 1 1 s e s e Y Y Y Y R R R R
s e s e s e - - + = e e r r r
      (3) 
where 
s eY Y ˆ ˆ r  (the “matching” index also known as G) is the correlation between the 
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, b ; Re and Rs are, 
respectively, the multiple correlations of the models of the environment and the judge, 
and capture, on the one hand, environmental predictability (Re), and on the other hand, 
the consistency with which the judge executes the decision rule (Rs).  Assuming that 
the  error  terms  of  the  two  models  are  independent,  i.e., 0 =
s ee e r ,  achievement  is 
simply  a  multiplicative  function  of  three  terms:  matching,  environmental 
predictability,  and  response  consistency,  and  neatly  captures  the  effects  of  both 
cognitive and task variables on observed performance or achievement. 
Given the above lens model framework, we now develop the probabilities that 
our models will make correct predictions within a given population or environment.   16 
As will be seen, these probabilities reflect the covariance structure of the cues used as 
well as those between the criterion and the cues.  It is these covariances that describe 
the inferential environment in which judgments are made.  At the same time, we also 
develop equations for showing the effects of different levels of errors.   
The SV model. The lens model – and the lens model equation (3) – have been 
used extensively to illuminate many issues in judgmental research (Brehmer & Joyce, 
1988; Cooksey, 1996).  However, here we ask a different question.  Imagine that the 
judge does not decide by using a linear combination rule, but instead simply chooses 
the  candidate  who  is  better  on  a  single  variable,  1 X ,  (years  of  experience,  for 
example).  Thus, the decision rule is to choose the candidate for whom  1 X  is larger, 
e.g., choose A if   b a x x 1 1 > .  Our question now becomes, what is the probability that A 
is better than B using this decision rule in a given environment or population, that is, 
what is,  ( ) ( ) { } b a b e a e X X Y Y P 1 1 > Ç > ?   
   To calculate this probability, we follow the model presented in Hogarth and 
Karelaia  (2005b).  We  first  assume  that  e Y   and  1 X   are  both  standardized  normal 
variables (i.e., with means of 0 and variances of 1) and that the cue used is positively 
correlated  with  the  criterion.
8  Denote  the  correlation  by  the  parameter
1 X Ye r , 
( 0
1 > X Ye r ).  Given these facts, it is possible to represent Yea and Yeb by the equations: 
ea a X Y ea v X Y
e + = 1 1 r              (4) 
and   eb b X Y eb v X Y
e + = 1 1 r              (5) 
where  ea v and  eb v   are  normally  distributed  error  terms,  each  with  mean  of  0  and   
variance of  ( )
2
1 1 X Ye r - , independent of each other and of  a X1  and  b X1 . 
                                                
8 We consider the implications of our normality assumption in the Discussion.   17 
  The question of determining  ( ) ( ) { } b a b e a e X X Y Y P 1 1 > Ç >  can be reframed as 
determining  ( ) ( ) { } 0 0 2 1 > Ç > d d P  where  0 1 > - = eb ea Y Y d , and  0 1 1 2 > - = b a X X d .    
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To calculate the expected accuracy of the SV model in a given environment,                           
it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  cases  where  both  b a X X 1 1 >   and                                
a b X X 1 1 >   such  that  the  overall  probability  is  given  by      
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } a b ea eb b a b e a e X X Y Y X X Y Y P 1 1 1 1 > Ç > È > Ç >   which,  since  both  its 
components are equal, can be simplified as       
   ( ) ( ) { }= > Ç > b a b e a e X X Y Y P 1 1 2 ∫∫
¥ ¥
0 0
) ( 2 dd d f       (7) 
The  LC  model.  Following  the  same  rationale,  we  can  also  determine  the 
probability that using a linear combination of cues will result in a correct choice.  That 
is, proceeding in exactly the same manner as above, one can express Yea and Yeb as 
functions of Ysa and Ysb, define appropriate error terms,  a w  and  b w , and substitute, 
respectively,  
s eY Y r   for 
1 X Ye r , and   sa Y  and  sb Y   for   a X1  and  b X1 .  Thus, one can 
show that  ( ) ( ) { } b s a s b e a e Y Y Y Y P > Ç > 2  can also be found through expression (7), with   18 
) (d F  defined as in SV. The only difference between SV and LC lies in the variance-


















The EW model. EW is, of course, a special case of LC.  Define  b a X X d - = 2 , 




















, and note that  2 d  is a normal variable with 
a mean of 0.
9 Thus, the expected accuracy of EW can be defined by equation (7)   
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  The analogous expressions for the CONF and TTB models are presented in 
Appendix A. 
  Loss functions.  Equation (7) as well as its analogs in Appendix A can be used 
to estimate the probabilities that the models will make the correct decisions.  These 
probabilities  can  be  thought  of  as  the  average  percentage  correct  scores  that  the 
models  achieve  in  choosing  between  two  alternatives.  As  such,  this  measure  is 
equivalent to a 0/1 loss function which does not distinguish between small and large 
errors. To overcome this deficiency, we introduce the notion that losses from errors 
reflect the degree to which predictions are incorrect.   
Specifically, to calculate the expected loss resulting from using SV across a 
given population, we need to consider the possible losses that can occur when the 
model does not select the best alternative. We model loss by a symmetric squared 
error loss function but allow this to vary in “exactingness” or the extent to which the 
environment does or does not punish errors severely (Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie, & 
                                                
9 The variable  1 d  for EW is the same as for LC:  eb ea Y Y d - = 1 . 
10 Note that from equation (3) it follows that  e X Y X Y R
e e ˆ r r =  (assuming 0 =
s ee e r ).    19 
Marquis, 1991). We note that loss occurs when (1)  b a X X 1 1 >  but  b e a e Y Y < , and (2) 
b a X X 1 1 <  but  b e a e Y Y > . Capitalizing on symmetry, the expected loss (EL) associated 
with the population can therefore be written as 
         ( ) ( ) { }L X X Y Y P EL b a b e a e SV 1 1 2 > Ç < =         (8) 
where ( )
2
ea eb Y Y L - =a .  In  other  words,  the  expected  loss  is  proportional  to  the 
squared difference between  b e Y  and  a e Y  weighted by the probability that  b e a e Y Y <  
and b a X X 1 1 > .  The  constant  of  proportionality,  a (> 0),  is  the  “exactingness” 
parameter that captures how heavily losses should be counted.   
Substituting  ( )
2
ea eb Y Y - a   for  L  and  following  the  same  rationale  as  when 
developing the expression for accuracy, the expected loss of the SV model can be 
expressed as:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) { }= > Ç < - = b a b e a e ea eb SV X X Y Y P Y Y EL 1 1






1 ) ( 2 dd d f d a         (9) 
As in the expression for accuracy, the function  ) (d f  for SV involves the variance-
covariance matrix SV f M _ . The expected loss of LC and EW are found analogically, 
using their appropriate variance-covariance matrices.   
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------- 
In Table 1, we summarize the expressions for accuracy and loss for SV, LC, 
and EW. In Appendix B, we present the formulas for the loss functions of CONF and 
TTB.  Finally, note that expected loss, as expressed by equation (9), is proportional to 
the  exactingness  parameter,  a,  that  models  the  extent  to  which  particular 
environments punish errors. (We manipulate this factor below.)    20 
Exploring effects of different environments     
  We first construct and simulate several task environments and demonstrate 
how our theoretical analyses can be used to make predictions for all of our models in 
terms of both expected percentage correct predictions and expected losses.  We also 
show  how  errors  in  the  application  of  both  linear  models  and  heuristics  affect 
performance and thus illustrate potential trade-offs involved in using different models. 
We further note that, in many environments, heuristic models achieve similar levels of 
performance and thus explicitly explore this issue using simulation. To make the link 
from theory to empirical phenomena, we report data from a meta-analysis of lens 
model  studies  that  we  use  to  compare  the  judgmental  performance  of  theoretical 
heuristics with that of people using LC models. 
  Constructed and simulated environments. To demonstrate our approach, we 
constructed several sets of different three-cue environments using the model implicit 




j j e e X Y e b + =∑
=1
,     (1´) 
Our approach was to vary systematically two factors: (1) the weights given to the 
variables as captured by the distribution of cue validities; (2) the level of average 
inter-cue correlation. As a consequence, we obtain environments with different levels 
of predictability as indicated by Re (from low to high).  We could not, of course, vary 
these factors in an orthogonal design (due to mathematical restrictions), and hence 
used several different sets of designs. 
  For each of these, it is straightforward to calculate expected correct predictions 
and losses for all our models
11 (see equations above) with one exception.  This is the 
                                                
11 For the TTB model, we defined a threshold of 0.50 (with standardized variables) to decide whether a 
variable  discriminated  between  two  alternatives.  Whereas  the  choice  of  0.50  was  subjective,   21 
LC model which requires specification of
s eY Y r , that is, the “achievement index” or the 
correlation between the criterion and the person’s responses.  However, given the lens 
model equation – see equation (3) above – we know that  
s eY Y r  = 
s eY Y ˆ ˆ r
s eR R       
                                             (10)  
where Re  captures the predictability of the environment and 
s eY Y ˆ ˆ r Rs   the extent to 
which the person’s judgment ability meets the demands of the task, i.e., the product of 
“matching” and “consistency.” 
12  Lindell (1976) referred to 
s eY Y ˆ ˆ r Rs   as “performance” 
because this part of achievement can be considered separately from task predictability 
or Re. We prefer to call it “linear cognitive ability” or ca to capture the notion that it 
measures how well someone is using the linear model in terms of both matching 
weights  and  consistency  of  execution.
13    In  short,  our  strategy  is  to  vary  ca  and 
observe how well the LC model performs. In other words, how accurate would people 
be  in  binary  choice  when  modeled  as if  using  a  linear combination  of cues  with 
differing levels of “knowledge” (matching of weights) and consistency in execution 
of their knowledge? 
For example, from a psychological perspective an interesting comparison is 
the point where the use of an LC strategy is equaled by that of a single variable (SV). 
This  occurs when  the validity of  SV equals that  of the person using LC,  that is, 
when
1 X Ye r  = 
s eY Y r = caRe   or when ca = (
1 X Ye r /Re).  One way of thinking about this is 
to see that, from a predictive viewpoint, it captures the point of indifference between 
making a judgment using all the data (i.e., with LC) and relying on a single cue (SV) 
                                                                                                                                       
investigation shows quite similar results if this threshold is varied between 0.25 and 0.75. We use the 
threshold of 0.5 in all further calculations and illustrations.  
12 The assumption made here is that 
s ee e r = 0, see equation (3).   
13  Recall that “using” is employed here in an as if manner.   22 
such  as  representativeness  (Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1972)  or  affect  (Slovic  et  al., 
2002).       
  The first set of environmental parameters that we consider involves four cases 
(A, B, C, and D) – see Table 2.  Here we examine equal and differential cue validities 
(case A versus the others), low but positive inter-cue correlations (cases A and C), 
negative  inter-cue  correlation  (case  B),  and  moderately  high  inter-cue  correlation 
(case D). These parameters imply different levels of environmental predictability (or 
lack of “noise”), that is Re, which varies from 0.66 to 0.93.  In the right hand column, 
we show values of (
1 X Ye r /Re) which indicate the benchmarks for determining when 
SV or LC performs better.  Specifically, LC performs better than SV when ca exceeds 
(
1 X Ye r /Re).   
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 and Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
 
  Figure  3  depicts  expected  percentage  correct  predictions  of  the  different 
models as a function of linear cognitive ability or ca. In addition, Figure 3 recognizes 
the possibility that the decision maker could err in using the SV and TTB models – 
specifically by failing to order the variables according to their cue validities.  This is 
shown in respect of SV in the four left-hand side panels and for TTB in the four right-
hand side panels. Here the lines SVr and TTBr show expected performance if cues are 
selected or ordered at random and the shaded areas indicate the range of possible 
performance levels from best (the correct order) to worst (most incorrect order). 
A  first  comment  is  that,  in  a  relative  sense,  model  performance  varies  by 
environments.    In  case  A  (equal  cue  validities and  low  cue  inter-correlation), for 
example, EW performs best and CONF is also more effective than TTB.  SV lags   23 
behind.  Note that, in this environment, it does not matter whether heuristics identify 
the correct ordering of cues because each cue has the same validity. 
This picture changes when the cue validities differ.  In case B (with negative 
inter-cue  correlation),  EW  is  still  best,  but  only  slightly,  whereas  TTB  now 
outperforms  CONF.    As  cue  inter-correlation  increases,  however,  differences  in 
model performance decrease – examine cases C and D – and EW no longer has the 
best performance. As can also be seen, errors in failing to identify the correct ordering 
of cues can hinder performance in environments B, C, and D. 
  Second, consider the performance of LC as a function of ca. First note that 
equality  between  LC  and  SV  occurs,  for  each  of  the  cases,  at  the  critical  points 
enumerated at the right of Table 2.  Thus, for example, LC needs less linear cognitive 
ability in case A (0.62) to do better than SV than in case C (0.80).   Interestingly, in 
all the environments illustrated, linear cognitive ability has to be quite high before it 
starts to be competitive with the better heuristics. Indeed, it is only in case B that LC 
has the best performance and this when linear cognitive ability starts to exceed 0.85. 
  The simple conclusion from this analysis – which we explore further below – 
is that unless linear cognitive ability is “high,” decision makers are better off using 
simple heuristics provided that they implement these correctly.     
  In Figure 4, we show differential performance in terms of expected loss where 
the exactingness parameter, a, is equal to 1.00.  A comparison of Figures 3 and 4 
shows the same pattern of results in terms of relative model performance. Once again, 
we also illustrate the effects of errors in the use of SV and TTB.  Figure 5 examines 
the effects of less exacting losses when a = 0.30.  Compared to Figure 4, we find the 
same relative ordering between  models  but differences in expected  loss  are  much   24 
smaller.  Indeed, the effect of changing a is to reduce or magnify (as appropriate) 
expected losses by a constant multiplier (see note 2 to Table 1). 
  To provide more insight, we constructed four further sets of environments – 
cases E, F, G, and H – each of which had eight sub-cases (i through viii) as specified 
in  Table  3.  In  cases  E  and  F,  the  distribution  of  cue  validities  was  quite  steep 
(decreasing constantly by one-half) and overall cue validity decreased across sub-
cases (i through viii). Cases G and H had a similar design except that the distribution 
of cue validities was flatter.  Cases E and G had low positive cue inter-correlation 
whereas  cases  F  and  H  had  higher  cue-intercorrelation.  A  consequence  of  these 
specifications was a range of environmental predictabilities (Re) from 0.37/0.39 to 
0.85/0.88 across all eight sets of sub-cases.  
------------------------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 and Figures 6 and 7 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Table 3 also documents expected percentage correct and losses (for a = 1.00) 
for all our models including LC which has been calculated using three different values 
for linear cognitive ability: ca = 0.5 for LC1; ca = 0.7 for LC2; and ca= 0.9 for LC3.  
The trends in Table 3 are perhaps better viewed by examining Figures 6 and 7 that 
document percentage correct and expected loss, respectively, of the different models 
as a function of the validity of the most valid cue, 
1 X Ye r .  Since here
1 X Ye r  is highly 
correlated  with  Re,  the  horizontal  axis  of  the  graphs  can  also  be  thought  of  as 
capturing “noise” (more, on the left, to less, at the right).  As with Figures 3 and 4, we 
use shaded areas to indicate the ranges of performance that can be achieved by SV (on 
the left) and TTB (on the right). 
  Abstracting first from the three LC models, there is a general trend (that could 
be expected) for differences in model performance to increase as noise or error in the   25 
environment decreases.  TTB dominates the other models in case E but is, in turn, 
dominated by SV in the more redundant case F.  In case G (where the distribution of 
cue validities is flatter), EW and TTB are the better performing models, and EW does 
better than TTB when  
1 X Ye r  < 0.50.  In case H (involving greater redundancy), SV is, 
once again,  one of the better models.  CONF generally tracks EW closely  but is 
consistently  inferior  to  it.    The  difference  between  looking  at  percentage  correct 
(Figure 6) and expected loss with a = 1.00 (Figure 7) is that differences between 
models are easier to observe with the latter. 
  In terms of linear cognitive ability, it is clear (and unsurprising) that more is 
better than less. Interestingly, however, as the environment becomes more predictable 
the effectiveness of the LC models drops off relative to the simpler heuristics. (This 
can also be seen by considering the 
1 X Ye r /Re column in Table 3.)  In the environments 
examined here, the best LC model (with ca = 0.9) is always outperformed by one of 
the other heuristics when 
1 X Ye r > 0.60.   
  Agreement between models. In many instances, strategies other than LC have 
quite similar performance. This raises the question of knowing how often they make 
identical predictions. To assess this, we calculated the probability that all pairs of 
strategies formed by SV, EW, TTB, and CONF would make the same choices across 
several  environments.    In  fact,  since  calculating  this  joint  probability  is  quite 
complicated in some cases, we actually simulated results based on 5,000 trials for 
each environment. 
Table  4  specifies  the  parameters  of  the  environments  we  considered,  the 
percentage  correct  predictions  for  each  model  in  each  environment,
14  and  the 
                                                
14 We had also calculated the theoretical probabilities of the simulated percentage correct predictions. 
Given the large sample sizes (5,000), theoretical and simulated results were almost identical.   26 
probabilities that models would make the same decisions.  As can be seen, there are 
two sets of environments, I and J, each with eight sub-sets (i through viii).  Set I has 
low cue inter-correlation; set J has moderate to high cue inter-correlation. Within each 
set, we vary predictability (Re) from high to low.   
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
We  make  three  remarks.  First,  whereas  there  is  considerable  variation  in 
percentage  correct  predictions  across  different  levels  of  predictability,  agreement 
between pairs of models hardly varies as a function of Re and is uniformly high. In 
particular, the rate of agreement lies between 0.70 and 0.92 across all comparisons 
and is probably higher than one might have imagined a priori. At the same time, this 
means that differences between the models occur in 8-30% of choices and, from a 
practical perspective, it is important to know when this happens and which model is 
more likely to be correct. Second, and as would be expected, the effect of increasing 
cue inter-correlation (or redundancy) is to increase the level of agreement between 
models. Third, for the environments illustrated here, the CONF and EW models have 
the highest level of agreement whereas the SV-EW and SV-TTB have the lowest. The 
latter result is perhaps surprising in that both SV and TTB are so dependent on the 
most valid cue.    
  Comparisons with experimental data.  Although instructive, the above analysis 
has been at a theoretical level and raises the issue of “how good” people are at making 
decisions with linear models as opposed to using heuristics.  To answer this question, 
we undertook a meta-analysis of lens model studies to estimate ca. This involved   
attempting to locate all lens model studies reported in the literature that provided 
estimates of the elements of equation (3). Studies therefore had to have a criterion   27 
variable and involve the judgments of individuals (as opposed to groups of people).
15 
Moreover, we only considered cases where the number of independent variables or 
cues was greater or equal to two (when there is only one cue, 
s eY Y ˆ ˆ r = 1.00 necessarily).  
In all, we located 77 (mainly) published papers that allowed us to examine judgmental 
performance across 252 different task environments (i.e., environments that vary by 
statistical parameters and/or substantive conditions). 
In  Table  5,  we  summarize  key  statistics  from  the  meta-analysis  (for  full 
details, see Karelaia & Hogarth, in preparation).  First, we note that these studies 
represent  much  data.  They  are  the  result  of  approximately  5,000  participants 
providing a total of some 320,000 judgments.  In fact, many of these studies involved 
learning and, since we characterize judgmental performance by that achieved in the 
last block of experimental trials reported, the participants actually made many more 
judgments.    Second,  we  provide  several  breakdowns  of  different  lens  model  and 
performance statistics that are the means across studies of individual data that have 
been averaged within studies (i.e., the units of analysis are the mean data of particular 
studies).  We distinguish between expert and novice participants, laboratory and field 
studies, environments that involved different numbers of cues, different weighting 
functions, and different levels of redundancy (or cue inter-correlation).  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Briefly, we find no differences in performance between participants who are 
experts  or  novices  (the  latter,  however,  are  assessed  after  learning)  nor  between 
laboratory and field studies. Holding the predictability of the environment constant 
(i.e., Re), performance (both ra and LC accuracy) is somewhat better with fewer cues, 
                                                
15 We also excluded studies from the interpersonal conflict paradigm where the criterion for one’s 
person’s judgments is the judgment of another person (see, e.g., Hammond, Wilkins, & Todd, 1966).   28 
and with equal as opposed to differential weighting functions.  Parenthetically, in 
characterizing  the  latter,  we  classify  functions  as  non-compensatory  if,  when  cue 
validities are ordered in magnitude, the validity of each cue exceeds the sum of those 
smaller than it (cf., Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999; 2002). We define all other functions 
as compensatory except for the special case of equal-weighting. 
Overall, the LC accuracy reported in the right hand column of Table 5 is about 
70%. In interpreting this figure, it is important to bear in mind that it is derived from 
an estimate of linear cognitive ability (ca or GRs) of 0.66 and that this figure is a mean 
estimate  across  individual  studies  each  of  which  is  described  by  the  mean  of 
individual data. Table 5 obscures individual variation.    
To capture the differences in performance between LC and the heuristic models, 
one needs specific information on the statistical properties of tasks (essentially the 
covariation  matrix  used  to  generate  the  environmental  criterion)  and  to  make 
predictions  for  each  environment.    Recall  also  that,  in  the  lens  model  paradigm, 
performance – or “achievement” – is measured in terms of correlation.  We therefore 
transformed the measure of achievement into one of performance in binary choice 
using the methods described above, that is, by assessing the performance of LC with 
different levels of linear cognitive ability, ca.  Thus, to measure the effectiveness of 
LC relative to any heuristic in a particular environment, we considered the difference 
in  expected  predictive ability between LC  based on  the  mean ca observed in the 
environment and that of the heuristic.   In other words, we ask how well the average 
performance levels of humans using LC compare to those of heuristics.  
In Table 6, we summarize this information for environments involving three 
and two cues (details are provided in Appendices C and D).  Unfortunately, not all   
studies in our meta-analysis provided the information needed and thus we are limited   29 
to  approximately  two-thirds  of  tasks  involving  three  cues,  and  one-half  of  tasks 
involving two cues.  We also note, parenthetically, that although some environments 
had  identical  statistical  properties,  they  can  be  considered  different  because  they 
involved different treatments (e.g., how participants had been trained, various forms 
of feedback, presentation of information, and so on).   
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
The upper panel of Table 6 summarizes the data from Appendix C.  The first 
column  (on  the  left)  shows  the  maximum  performance  that  could  be achieved  in     
environments  characterized  by  equal-weighting,  compensatory,  and  non-
compensatory  functions,  respectively.    This  captures  the  predictability  of  the 
environments  (81%  for  equal  weighting  and  compensatory  and  82%  for  non-
compensatory). These environments are also marked by little redundancy. Over 80% 
have  mean  inter-cue  correlations  of  0.00.  In  the  body  of  the  table,  we  present 
performance in terms of percentage correct for LC – based on mean cognitive ability 
observed in each of the experimental studies – as well as the performance that would 
have been achieved by the different heuristics in those same environments.  Thus, one 
way  of  interpreting  the  LC  column  is  as  the  performance  that  would  have  been 
achieved  in  binary  choice  by  the  mean  participant  in  each  study  (in  terms  of 
judgmental ability).   
As  would  be  expected,  the  EW  strategy  performs  best  in  equal  weighting 
environments  (80%)  and  the  TTB  strategy  best  in  the  non-compensatory 
environments (77%).  Interestingly, in these compensatory environments, it is the EW 
model  that  performs  best  (77%).    The  mean  LC  model  never  has  the  best   30 
performance.  Compared to the heuristic models, its performance is relatively better in 
the equal weighting as opposed to the other environments.   
In the discussion so far, we have concentrated on effects of error in using LC 
(by  focusing  on  ca).  However,  the  columns headed  SVr  and  TTBr  illustrate  the 
effects of making errors in using heuristics.  This shows that the performance of LC 
(at mean ca level) is as good as or better than SVr and TTBr across all three types of 
environments.   
In the lower panel of  Table 6, we present the data based on analyzing studies 
with two cues where, once again, most environments involve orthogonal cues (73%) – 
details are provided in Appendix D. Conclusions are similar to the three cue case.  
EW is necessarily best when the environment involves an equal weighting function 
and TTB performs well in the non-compensatory environments although it is bettered 
here by the SV model (just).
16  
Since most published studies do not report individual data, it is difficult to 
assess the importance of individual variation in performance in particular tasks and, 
specifically, how individual LC performance compares with heuristics in such tasks.  
Two papers involving two-cues did report the necessary data (Steinmann & Doherty, 
1972; York et al., 1987).  Table 7 summarizes the comparisons.  This shows (reading 
from left to right), the number of participants in each task, statistical properties of the 
tasks, percentage performance correct by the LC model (mean and range), and the 
percentage of participants that have better performance with LC than with particular 
heuristics. (Note the three tasks reported by York et al., 1987 have identical statistical 
characteristics but involved different substantive manipulations of information). 
                                                
16  The following rule was used to adapt the CONF model for two cues: If both cues suggest the same 
alternative, choose it.  Otherwise, choose at random.   31 
Clearly, one cannot generalize from the four environments presented in Table 
7.  However,  it  is  of  interest  to  note  that,  first,  the  ranges  of  individual  LC 
performances  are  quite  large  (24%  to  31%),  and  second,  a  limited  number  of 
participants can have better performance with LC than with the heuristics.  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Summary.  At  a  theoretical  level,  we  have  shown  that  the  performance  of 
heuristic rules is affected by several factors: the type of weighting function (i.e., how 
the environment weights cues); cue redundancy or inter-correlation; the predictability 
of the environment; and loss functions.  The weighting function determines which 
heuristic is best suited to specific tasks and this depends on how its characteristics 
match  that  of  the  tasks  confronted.    For  example,  EW  is  better  in  equal 
weighting/compensatory  environments  and  TTB  and  SV  in  non-compensatory 
environments.  The effect of cue redundancy is generally to reduce differences in the 
relative  predictive  abilities  of  the  heuristics.    As  environments  become  more 
predictable, all models perform better but differences between models also increase. 
Finally, the effect of loss functions is to accentuate or dampen differences between 
evaluations of model predictions.   
We also used simulation to investigate the extent to which models agree with 
each other.  At one level, all the models we investigated were “sensible” and used 
valid  information.  As  such,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  they  exhibited  much 
agreement.  The extent of the agreement, however, was surprising. Even when the 
predictability  of  the  environment  varied  greatly,  the  level  of  agreement  between 
particular models hardly changed (cf., Table 4).  From a predictive viewpoint, this 
might  be  thought  comforting.    But  it  also  accentuates  the  need  to  know  which   32 
heuristic is more likely to be correct in the 8-30% of cases in which they disagree – 
and thus the importance of identifying when different heuristics are more effective.    
The differential impact of environmental factors is illustrated quantitatively in 
Table  8  which  reports  the  results  of  regressing  performance  of  the  heuristics 
(percentage  correct)  on  environmental  factors:  type  of  weighting  function 
(represented  by  dummy  variables),  redundancy  (cue  inter-correlation),  and 
predictability (Re).  This is done for the 52 populations specified in Tables 2, 3, and 4. 
Results show the importance of non-compensatory environments and redundancy on 
SV (positive) and EW and CONF (both negative). Interestingly, for the conditions 
examined  here,  the  performance  of  TTB  is  not  affected  by  these  factors  thereby 
suggesting a heuristic that is robust to environmental variations (for further analysis of 
this issue, see Baucells, Carrasco, & Hogarth, 2006). Finally, all models benefit from 
greater predictability. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
An important conclusion from our theoretical analysis is that  unless linear 
cognitive  ability  (ca)  is  high,  people  are  better  off  relying  on  trade-off  avoiding 
heuristics rather than using linear models.  At the same time, however, the application 
of heuristic rules can involve error (e.g., variables not used in the appropriate order in 
TTB).  This therefore raised the issue of estimating linear cognitive ability (ca) from 
empirical data and noting when this was “large enough” to do without heuristics.    
Our theoretical analyses suggested that ca needed to be larger than about 0.7 
for LC models to perform better than heuristics. Across the 252 task environments of 
the meta-analysis we estimated ca to be 0.66. However, this is a mean and does not 
take account  of  differences  in  task  environments.    For  those  environments  where   33 
precise predictions could be made, LC models based on mean ca estimates performed 
at a level inferior to the best heuristics but equal to or better than heuristics executed 
with error.  Unfortunately, the data did not allow us to make a thorough investigation 
of individual variation in ca values.  However, to the extent that we could do this, 
only a minority of individuals appeared capable of outperforming heuristics using LC.    
 
General discussion  
  Our goal has been to show how different views of heuristic decision making 
can be reconciled within a framework that also encompasses the representation of 
human  judgment  as  linear  models.    Central  to  our  work  is  the  importance  of 
understanding the effects  of different  environments that  we have characterized by 
statistical properties.  Given the inherent uncertainty in inference, this approach seems 
eminently sensible (cf., Brunswik, 1952). We now consider implications that are, first, 
psychological,  second,  normative,  and  third,  methodological  in  nature.  We  also 
outline extensions for further work. 
Psychological implications.  All of the models (heuristics) we have examined 
can be thought of representing “ideal-types.”  Thus, it is legitimate to ask how their 
mathematical representations capture underlying psychological processes.  This is not 
a  new  issue  (see,  e.g.,  Hoffman,  1960;  Einhorn  et  al.,  1979)  and  –  apart  from 
predictive tests – we believe the answer lies in assessing logical consistency between 
the  assumptions  of  models  and  the  information  processing  operations  actually 
performed by humans.  
Consider, for example, the SV (the simplest) and the LC (arguably the most 
complex)  models. For the former,  we can argue that the psychological process is 
“modeled” correctly if the assumption that the judgment is based on a single cue is   34 
verified. It does not matter, for example, if the individual looks at other cues and then 
ignores them.  For the latter, checking for consistency is more complex.  Were all 
cues  examined?  Were  weights  attached  to  the  cues?    Were  the  weighted  sums 
aggregated to form a global judgment?  Note that there is no need to say that actual 
mathematical  formulae  were  used.  All  one  would  need  to  show  is  that  mental 
operations took place that led to outcomes consistent with the operations.  Nor do we 
need to indicate the micro-processes that underlie the cognitive operations although, 
in an ideal world, these would also be consistent with the postulated framework.  The 
evidence that would argue most against the LC model would be the demonstration 
that part of the information was ignored. 
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, the claim that the different models 
capture  actual  processes  is  made  at  a  level  of  analysis  that  represents  mental 
operations in an “as if” manner.  Moreover, by defining the statistical properties of 
task environments, we show at a theoretical level how characteristics of models and 
tasks  result  in  different  levels  of  performance.    This  is  an  important  contribution 
because it provides the basis for developing an environmental theory of judgmental 
performance (cf., Brunswik, 1952; Simon, 1956). 
The environment, however, is not captured by statistical properties alone since 
context  can  be  important.  Within  our  framework,  contextual  effects  would  be 
reflected in how people use heuristics.  Consider, for example, what happens when 
cue variables are inappropriately labeled. Within LC models, this would be captured 
by reductions in linear cognitive ability (ca)  because people give less appropriate 
weights to the variables.  With the TTB model, it could result in using cues in an 
inappropriate  order.    In  short,  our  approach  is  built  on  a  statistical  analysis  of 
environmental tasks.  The mediating effects of context are captured by their impact on   35 
how people use decision rules. Since it is people who are differentially susceptible to 
contextual effects, we believe this makes sense. 
One claim we do make is that the range of models we considered covers the 
types of heuristics that have been discussed in the literature as well, of course, as the 
linear model. Thus, the SV model captures precisely what happens when people make 
decisions based on a single cue such as representativeness (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972),  availability  (Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1973),  recognition  (Goldstein  & 
Gigerenzer, 2002) or affect (Slovic et al., 2002).  All these models have in common 
the notion that people use a single cue that has imperfect validity. However, whether 
this implies that people are misguided or justified in relying on a single cue can not be 
decided on an a priori basis but depends – in particular cases – on how valid the single 
cue is, what other relevant information is available, and the costs of making errors.  
From our perspective, it is understandable that some researchers see the “glass as half-
empty” while others see it “as half-full.”    
An important contribution of our analysis is to highlight the role of error in the 
use of different models – as opposed to error or “noise” in the environment.  Within 
LC, error is measured by the extent to which linear cognitive ability (ca or GRs) falls 
short of 1.00. Here, error can have two sources:  incorrect weighting of variables and 
inconsistency  in  execution.  With  TTB,  the  analogous  error  results  from  using 
variables in an inappropriate order (and in SV from using less valid cues).  Thus, the 
errors in the two types of models involve both knowledge and execution although in 
the latter execution errors are less likely given the simpler processes involved. 
An advantage of our meta-analysis of lens model studies is that one can say 
something about the effects of errors within the LC framework. Across all our studies,   
the mean estimates for both G and Rs are approximately 0.80 (Table 5). Moreover,   36 
only 11% of GRs values exceed 0.90.  That is, the meta-analysis reveals much error in 
both  knowledge  and  execution.    Note  also  that  although  G  and  Rs  are  positively 
correlated, 0.43 (p < .001), neither G nor Rs are correlated with the predictability of 
the environment (Re) – 0.03 for G and 0.09 for Rs. In other words, there is a trend for 
people  to  be  more  consistent  in  executing  strategies  when  these  are  more  valid. 
However,  there  is  no  relation  between  how  predictable  an  environment  is  and 
people’s judgmental strategies other than a kind of probability matching result where, 
overall, mean Re and Rs are approximately equal.   
Given  the  difficulty  of  executing  the  LC  model  well,  it  is  of  interest  to 
speculate when people can rely on this kind of process.  We suspect that many models 
of this type – or “as if” versions – are used when judgmental processes have been 
automated (or become “tacit,” Hogarth, 2001) such that people do not need to think 
about executing trade-offs.  Imagine, for example, basic processes such as perception 
or situations where past practice has been sufficient to hone a person’s skills. These 
include the judgments that most of us can exercise when driving an automobile, and 
that  experts  exhibit  in  different  activities  such  as  controlling  complex  systems   
playing music, or even different sports (cf., Shanteau et al., 2005).     
An interesting feature of most tasks studied in the decision making literature is 
that they are difficult precisely because people lack the experience necessary to take 
action  without  explicit  thought  and  thus  are  unable  to  invoke  valid,  automatic 
processes.    This  issue  emphasizes  the  need  to  understand  the  natural  ecology  of 
decision making tasks (Dhami, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2004). 
  Normative implications.  Our work has many normative implications in that it 
spells out the conditions under which different heuristics are effective.  Moreover, the   37 
fact that this is achieved analytically – instead of through simulation – represents an 
advance over current practice (see also Hogarth & Karelaia, in press b).  
  An interesting normative implication relates to the trade-offs in different types 
of error when using heuristics or models.  As noted above, one way of characterizing 
our empirical analysis is to say that judgmental performance using the cognitively 
demanding LC models is roughly equal to that of using heuristics with error, that is, 
of SVr and TTBr.  However, is there a relation between linear cognitive ability (ca) 
and the knowledge necessary to know when and how to apply heuristic rules? 
Given our results, how should a decision maker approach a predictive task? 
Much depends on prior knowledge of task characteristics and thus how the individual 
acquired  the  necessary  knowledge.  Basically  –  at  one  extreme  –  if  all  cues  are   
approximately equally valid, EW should be used explicitly.  Similarly – at the other 
extreme – when facing a non-compensatory weighting function, TTB or SV would be 
hard  to  beat  with  LC.    The  problem  lies  in  tasks  that  have  more  compensatory 
features. The key, therefore, lies in assessing linear cognitive ability (ca).  How likely 
is the judge to know the relative weights to give the variables?  How consistent is he 
or she in using the judgmental strategy?  Based on our meta-analysis, we expect that a 
minority of persons can meet these conditions but that much also depend on the nature 
of the task and the individual’s predictive experience. For example, one would be 
justified  in  trusting  the  judgments  of  the  weather  forecasters  studied  by  Stewart, 
Roebber, and Bosart (1997) but not those of Einhorn’s (1972) physicians.   
Our analysis points to the importance of knowledge – about the kind of task 
and the capacity to handle task demands. This, in turn, raises psychological issues of 
how people acquire such knowledge or are helped to do so.  Overall, our results 
suggest that for many tasks the errors incurred by using LC strategies are greater than   38 
those implicit in using heuristics.  Thus, judgmental performance could be improved 
if people explicitly used appropriate heuristics instead of relying on what is often their 
untested  and  unaided  judgment.    However,  that  people  resist  doing  so  has  been 
documented many times (Dawes et al., 1989; Kleinmuntz, 1990).  It seems that a high 
level of sophistication is needed to understand when to ignore information and use a 
heuristic. Perhaps LC strategies are psychologically attractive precisely because they 
allow people to feel they have considered all information (cf., Einhorn, 1986).     
  Methodological implications. Our work involves methodological innovations.  
Not  only  have  we  developed  analytical  tools  for  problems  that  frequently  use 
simulation, we have also provided a common framework within which linear and 
heuristic models can be compared.   This therefore opens the way to compare and 
contrast different ways of studying judgment and decision making.  
  Several issues suggested further work.  First, in this paper, we have limited 
ourselves to a binary choice paradigm involving three cues.  This can be extended in 
two ways: first, to consider more alternatives, and second, more cues.  Our previous 
work  (Hogarth  &  Karelaia,  in  press  a,  b),  suggests  that  changing  the  number  of 
alternatives  will  not  have  a  major  influence  on  relative  performance  of  different 
models.  Increasing  the  number  of  cues,  however,  could  have  important  impacts 
depending on the nature of inter-cue correlation.   
  Second,  all  our  statistical  analyses  have  been  conducted  using  normal 
distributions and it would be of interest to see the effects of changing this assumption. 
In particular, what would happen if distributions were skewed and/or had fatter tails 
than the normal distribution?  Further interesting complications could involve effects 
where models have correlated error terms.      39 
  Third, although our work innovated in this domain by showing the effects of 
loss functions, we only varied the “exactingness” parameter and not the symmetric 
nature of losses.  It would be of interest to explore asymmetries in loss. 
  Concluding comments.  As noted at the outset of this paper, our goal has not 
been  to  “unify”  different  traditions  of  judgmental  research.    However,  we  have 
developed a framework in which to compare results. Thus, we have been able to make 
direct comparisons between research in the long-standing lens model tradition with 
the more recent work on heuristic decision making.  Central to our approach has been 
the need to specify and model characteristics of task environments for it is this that 
determines which and why particular heuristics are more or less successful.  It also 
provides guidance as to the level of expertise needed to use the more demanding LC 
models.  At the same time, we emphasize the need for knowledge – or maps – to 
know when to use specific heuristics.   How  people develop such maps is key to 
understanding much judgmental activity.   
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Table 1 – Key formulas for three models: SV, LC, and EW 
 
 
Model  variance-covariance matrix   
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Notes: 
1.  The expected accuracy of models is estimated as the probability of correctly 
selecting A over B, and is found as: 
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2.  The expected loss of models is found as:  
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where  a (> 0) is the “exactingness” parameter.  
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= ,  where  k  =  number  of  X  variables,  X Ye r   = 
average  correlation  between  Y  and  the  X’s,  and 
j iX X r =  average 
intercorrelations amongst the X’s. 
 
5.    ( )
j iX X X k
k
r s ) 1 ( 1
1
- + =      
   48 
Re          /Re
                                                                 
Case A 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.81 0.62
Case B 0.6 0.4 0.3 -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.93 0.64
Case C 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.75 0.80
Case D 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.66 0.91
Cue inter-correlations Cue validities 1 X Ye r
2 X Ye r  
1 X Ye r  
3 X Ye r
2 1X X r  
3 2X X r  
3 1X X r
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Re            /Re
                                                                  LC1* LC2* LC3* SV EW TTB CONF  LC1* LC2* LC3* SV EW TTB CONF 
Case E
i 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.88 0.91 64 71 79 80 76 82 74 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
ii 0.7 0.35 0.175 0.78 0.90 63 68 75 75 72 77 70 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
iii 0.6 0.3 0.15 0.69 0.87 61 66 71 70 69 72 67 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
iv 0.5 0.25 0.125 0.60 0.83 60 64 68 67 65 68 64 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
v 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.52 0.76 58 62 66 63 62 64 61 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6
vi 0.3 0.15 0.075 0.45 0.66 57 60 63 60 59 61 58 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7
vii 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.41 0.49 56 59 62 56 56 57 55 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
viii 0.1 0.05 0.025 0.37 0.27 56 58 61 53 53 54 53 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Case F
i 0.85 0.94 64 70 78 80 69 76 69 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4
ii 0.76 0.92 62 68 74 75 67 72 66 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
iii 0.67 0.89 61 66 71 70 64 68 64 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5
iv 0.59 0.85 59 63 68 67 62 65 61 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6
v 0.51 0.78 58 62 65 63 59 62 59 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7
vi 0.45 0.67 57 60 63 60 57 59 57 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
vii 0.40 0.49 56 59 62 56 55 56 54 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
viii 0.37 0.27 56 58 61 53 52 53 52 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
Case G
i 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.88 0.91 64 71 79 80 76 82 74 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
ii 0.7 0.4 0.2 0.80 0.88 63 69 76 75 74 78 71 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
iii 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.73 0.83 62 67 73 70 72 73 69 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
iv 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.66 0.75 61 65 70 67 70 70 67 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
v 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.61 0.65 60 64 69 63 68 66 66 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
vi 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.52 0.57 58 62 66 60 64 62 62 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5
vii 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.45 0.44 57 60 63 56 60 58 59 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6
viii 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.39 0.26 56 59 61 53 55 54 55 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8
Case H
i 0.85 0.94 64 70 78 80 69 76 69 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4
ii 0.76 0.93 62 68 74 75 68 73 67 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
iii 0.67 0.89 61 66 71 70 66 70 66 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
iv 0.60 0.83 60 64 68 67 65 67 64 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5
v 0.54 0.74 59 62 66 63 63 64 63 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
vi 0.47 0.64 58 61 64 60 61 61 60 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
vii 0.41 0.48 57 59 62 56 58 57 58 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7
viii 0.37 0.27 56 58 61 53 54 54 54 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9
* For LC1, c = 0.5; for LC2, c = 0.7; for LC3, c = 0.9.
Notes:       The performance of the best heuristic in each environment is highligted with bold characters. 
The performance of LC is underlined and presented on a darker background when it is superior or equal to that of "the best performer" among heuristics. 
same as in Case G
same as in Case E
all equal to 0.1
all equal to 0.5
all equal to 0.1
all equal to 0.5
Cue validities Cue inter-correlations Percentage correct Loss (a = 1.00) 
2 X Ye r  
1 X Ye r  
3 X Ye r
2 1X X r  
3 2X X r  
3 1X X r
 
1 X Ye r
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Cue validities Cue inter-correlations Re
                                                                  SV EW TTB CONF  SV- SV-  SV-  CONF-  TTB-  CONF- 
Case I EW CONF TTB EW EW TTB
i 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.96 80 82 86 79 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.87 0.80 0.77
ii 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.84 75 77 79 74 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.86 0.80 0.77
iii 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.73 71 72 73 69 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.86 0.80 0.77
iv 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.63 66 67 67 66 0.71 0.76 0.71 0.85 0.78 0.76
v 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.54 62 63 63 61 0.73 0.77 0.73 0.86 0.80 0.78
vi 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.49 59 61 61 61 0.70 0.76 0.70 0.85 0.78 0.76
vii 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.45 57 59 58 58 0.72 0.78 0.72 0.86 0.79 0.76
viii 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.38 53 54 53 53 0.71 0.77 0.71 0.85 0.79 0.76
Means 65 67 68 65 0.72 0.77 0.72 0.86 0.79 0.77
Case J
i 0.90 80 73 79 71 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.85
ii 0.78 74 70 74 68 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.85
iii 0.67 71 67 70 65 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.84
iv 0.58 67 64 66 63 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.91 0.88 0.85
v 0.50 64 61 63 60 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.91 0.87 0.84
vi 0.44 59 59 60 59 0.81 0.84 0.81 0.91 0.87 0.84
vii 0.42 58 59 58 59 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.91 0.88 0.85
viii 0.38 53 54 53 53 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.92 0.88 0.84
Means 66 63 65 62 0.81 0.83 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.85
Overall means 66 65 66 64 0.76 0.80 0.76 0.88 0.84 0.81
* Results are from simulations with 5,000 trials for each environment.
all equal to 0.5 same as in Case I
Rates of agreement Percentage correct
all equal to 0.1
2 X Ye r  
1 X Ye r  
3 X Ye r
2 1X X r  
3 2X X r  
3 1X X r
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No. of LC accuracy
studies  judges judgments       * G* Re Rs C* GRs (%)
Characteristics of tasks
Participants:
Experts 59 23 102 0.57 0.80 0.82 0.79 0.06 0.65 71
Novices 192 19 92 0.55 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.06 0.66 70
Unclassified 4
Type of study:
Laboratory 200 21 93 0.56 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.04 0.67 70
Field 51 15 95 0.55 0.76 0.77 0.85 0.11 0.66 70
Unclassified 4
Number of cues:
2 67 26 58 0.63 0.88 0.80 0.79 0.07 0.70 73
3 84 19 98 0.55 0.87 0.81 0.80 0.00 0.72 70
> 3 96 16 111 0.51 0.71 0.79 0.81 0.08 0.58 68
Unclassified 8
Type of weighting function:
Equal weighting 40 31 82 0.66 0.90 0.82 0.80 0.02 0.74 75
Compensatory 84 16 102 0.58 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.04 0.70 71
Non-compensatory 50 23 41 0.50 0.79 0.84 0.72 0.04 0.60 67
Unclassified 81
Cue redundancy:** 
None  92 22 56 0.61 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.03 0.72 72
Low-medium 79 19 98 0.53 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.03 0.66 68
High  26 25 105 0.54 0.77 0.75 0.80 0.10 0.64 69
Unclassified 58
Notes: 
*These statistics correspond to the sample estimates of the elements of the lens model equation presented in the text -- equation (3). 
(ra is the estimate of the "achievement" index,          ;G is the estimate of the matching index; and C is the estimate of the correlation
between residuals of the models of the person and the environment,           ).
** We define redundancy by the level of average inter-cue correlation. None implies the absolute value of average intercorrelation of 0; 
     low-medium -- the absolute value of <=0.4 (also described in text as "low", "moderate", "some"); 
    and high -- the absolute value of >0.4 (also described in text as "a lot", "high").
Average number of: Mean lens model statistics
s eY Y r
s ee e r
a r


















Weighting function correct LC
1 SV SVr EW CONF TTB TTBr environments
3- cue environments
2
Equal weighting 81 72 65 65 80 74 71 70 9
               
Compensatory 81 68 69 64 77 72 73 68 19
  
Non-compensatory 82 67 73 63 74 70 77 67 26
                 
              Subtotal 54
2 - cue environments
3
Equal weighting 94 79 73 73 92 73 80 80 12




1 --  Based on empirically observed mean linear cognitive ability (ca).
2 -- Averages calculated on the 54 environments detailed in Appendix C.
3 --  Averages calculated on the 33 environments detailed in Appendix D.
Bold indicates largest percentage correct in each row.
Performance -- Percentage correct using:
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Number
of
participants                                             Mean Max Min SV SVr TTB TTBr EW CONF
Steinmann & Doherty (1972) 22 0.95 0.69 0.65 0.00 73 85 58 45 50 18 18 0 50
York et al. (1987)
Group 1 15 0.86 0.78 0.37 0.00 70 84 53 7 57 7 36 7 57
Group 2 15 0.86 0.78 0.37 0.00 67 78 54 0 29 0 21 0 29
Group 3 15 0.86 0.78 0.37 0.00 72 80 54 14 71 0 57 0 71
tasks  (% correct) with better performance than:
Percentage of participants  LC performance Statistical properties of 
e R
1 X Ye r
2 X Ye r
2 1X X r
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SV EW TTB CONF
Regression coefficients
Intercept 34.1 43.0 36.7 43.1
t - statistic 31.1 46.2 44.3 48.7
Dummy: compensatory 2.0*
t - statistic 2.5
Dummy: non-compensatory 3.5 -2.4 -1.7
t - statistic 4.3 -5.3 -3.9
Redundancy 6.3 -6.1 -3.2
t - statistic 4.9 -5.6 -3.0
Predictability (Re) 45.2 40.5 48.9 36.3
t - statistic 27.0 31.4 37.5 29.6
Adjusted R
2   0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95
         
Notes:   (1) The regressions are based on 52 observations. The dummy variables for compensatory and
      non-compensatory weighting functions are expressed relative to equal weighting which is
      captured within the intercept term.
  (2) There are only three levels of redundancy: mean inter-cue correlation of -0.07, 0.1, and 0.5. 
(3) Only statistically significant coefficients are shown. All coefficients are significant (p < .001)  
      except when marked * for p < .05.
Table 8 -- Regression of model performance (percentage correct) on environmental characteristics  
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Figure 1: Knowledge required to achieve upper limits of model performance 
 
 
  Values of variables
1    Weights Ordering 
Model  Cue 1  Cue 2  Cue 3    "Exact"
2  First
3  All
3  None 
                 
Linear combination (LC)  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes       
Equal weighting (EW)  Yes  Yes  Yes          Yes 
Take-the-best (TTB)  Yes  Yes/No  Yes/No            Yes    
Single variable (SV)  Yes                Yes      
CONF  Yes  Yes  Yes/No          Yes 
                 
                 
1 Yes = value of cue required;   Yes/No = value of cue may be required.         
2 Exact values of cue weights required.             
3 First = most important cue identified; All = rank order of all cues known a priori.   
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Figures 3: Models performance: Cases A, B, C, and D (expected percentage correct),  
with lower and upper limits of accuracy for SV (four panels on left) and TTB (four panels on right).  
   58 
Figure 4: Models performance: Cases A, B, C, and D (expected loss for a=1.00),  
with lower and upper limits of losses for SV (four panels on left) and TTB (four panels on right).   59 
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Figure 6: Models performance: Cases E, F, G, and H (expected percentage correct),  
with lower and upper limits of accuracy for SV (four panels on left) and TTB (four panels on right).   61 
Figure 7: Models performance: Cases E, F, G, and H (expected loss for a=1.00)   
with lower and upper limits of losses for SV (four panels on left) and TTB (four panels on right).   62 
Appendix A – The expected accuracy of CONF and TTB. 
 
CONF  examines  cues  sequentially  and  makes  a  choice  when  two  cues 
favoring  one  alternative  are  encountered.  Therefore,  this  model  selects  the  better 
alternative out of two with probability of:  
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TTB also assesses cues sequentially. It makes a choice when a discriminating 
cue is found. In this paper, we consider TTB with a fixed threshold t (>0). Thus, the 
model stops consulting cues and makes a decision when t x x ib ia > - . This involves 
cases when both  ) ( t x x ib ia > -  and ) ( t x x ia ib > - . Since the two cases are symmetric, 
the probability that TTB selects the better alternative is:    63 
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where  both  ) , , ( ) ( 3 2 1 1 1 d d d f d f =   and  ) , , , ( ) ( 4 3 2 1 2 2 d d d d f d f =   are  the  same  as  in 
CONF,  and  ) , ( ) ( 2 1 3 3 d d f d f =   is  found  similarly,  using  the appropriate  variance  / 
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Appendix B – The expected loss of CONF and TTB 
 
The expected loss of CONF is:  
( ) ( ) ( ) { }
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with  ) ( 1 d f  and  ) ( 2 d f  are as defined in Appendix A.  
 
The expected loss of TTB is:  
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where  ) ( 1 d f ,  ) ( 2 d f , and  ) ( 3 d f  are as defined in Appendix A.    65 
No. Study Task  Number of  Total number of Stimuli per           across conditions 
conditions/tasks participants participant (range) GRs
Equal weighting environments 
1 Ashton (1981)  Predicting prices  3 138 30 0.01-0.98 -0.17-0.19 0.01-0.87
2a Brehmer & Hagafors (1986) Artificial prediction task 1 10 15 1.00 0.97 0.95
3 Chasseigne et al. (1999)  Artificial prediction task 5 220 120 0.57-0.98 0.37-0.78 0.67-0.82
Compensatory environments 
4 Chasseigne et al. (1977) - Experiment 1 Artificial prediction task 6 96 26 0.96 0.34-0.70 0.35-0.73
5 Kessler & Ashton (1981) Prediction of corporate bond ratings 4 69 34 0.74 0.52-0.64 0.71-0.88
6a* Steinmann (1974) Artificial prediction task 9 11 300 0.63-0.78 0.45-0.57 0.68-0.84
Non-compensatory environments 
2b Brehmer & Hagafors (1986) Artificial prediction task 2 20 15 0.77-1.00 0.74-0.78 0.71-0.75
7 Deane et al. (1972) - Experiment 2 Artificial prediction task 2 40 20 0.94 0.59-0.84 0.65-0.89
8 Hammond  et al. (1973) Artificial prediction task 3 30 20 0.92 0.05-0.78 0.14-0.83
9 Hoffman et al. (1981) Artificial prediction task 9 182 25 0.94 0.09-0.71 0.15-0.78
6b* Steinmann (1974) Artificial prediction task 6 11 100 0.63-0.74 0.44-0.65 0.70-0.85
10 Youmans & Stone (2005) Prediction of income levels 4 117 50 0.44 0.35-0.42 0.88-0.97
Total 54 944
Notes:
1. All studies reported involved between-subject designs unless studies No. 6a & 6b (indicated by *).
2. Three studies -- No. 7, 8, and 9 -- were said to have identical parameters.  However, there must have been some rounding differences  because of marginally different values reported for Re.
across conditions (range)  e R
a r
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No. Study Task  Number of  Total number of Stimuli per         across conditions 
conditions/tasks participants participant (range) GRs
Equal weighting environments 
1 Jarnecke & Rudestam (1976) Predict academic achievement  1 15 50 0.42 0.28 0.71
2 Lafon et al. (2004) Artificial prediction task 4 439 30 0.96 0.00-0.90 0.00-0.94
3 Rothstein (1986)  Artificial prediction task 6 72 100 1.00 0.81-1.00 0.80-1.00
4 Summers et al. (1969) Judging the age of blood cells 1 16 64 0.99 0.73 0.73
Non-compensatory environments 
5 Armelius & Armelius (1974) Artificial prediction task 3 63 25 0.99-1.00 0.32-0.96 0.32-0.95
6 Doherty et al. (1988) Artificial prediction task
Experiment 2 3 45 25 0.79-1.00 0.70-0.73 0.74-0.92
Experiment 6 2 30 50 0.87-1.00 0.53-0.66 0.58-0.73
7 Hammond & Summers (1965) Artificial prediction task 3 30 20 0.71 0.49-0.85 0.48-0.59
8 Lee & Yates (1992) Post-dicting student success 2 40 NA  0.38 0.24-0.29 0.51-0.59
9 Muchinsky & Dudycha (1975) Artificial prediction task
Experiment 1 2 160 150 0.72 0.04-0.30 0.11-0.54
Experiment 2 2 160 150 0.96 0.03-0.45 0.01-0.32
10 Steinmann & Doherty (1972) Assessing subjective probabilities
 in a bookbag and poker chip task 1 22 192 0.95 0.67* 0.70*
11 York et al. (1987)  Artificial prediction task 3 45 25 0.86 0.53-0.64 0.62-0.74
Total 33 1137
Notes: 
1. The number of participants in studies No. 3 and 8 are approximations since this information is not available. 
2. In study No. 10, "human performance" was measured through medians (marked with *). 
Mean human performance
across conditions (range)  e R
a r
Appendix D – Selected 2-cue studies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 